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THE OHIO DIVORCE REFORMS OF 1974
Ohio's divorce law has been reformed by the addition of two
new no-fault provisions to the traditional fault grounds for divorce.
The author examines the advantages of the newly enacted living
apart and dissolution of marriage provisions and considers the bene-
fits of a fault-no-fault system over a pure no-fault approach. He
proceeds to analyze the new provisions in order to anticipate some
of the problems in statutory interpretation that will arise. Finally,
the author suggests that with the adoption of no-fault divorce in
Ohio the time may be ripe to make conciliation services more readily
available than they are at present.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE OHIo General Assembly has recently enacted major reforms
of the state's divorce laws.- The legislature has abandoned the
traditional pure fault system of divorce in favor of a hybrid system.
This new scheme retains the basic fault grounds, 2 as modified by the
elimination of the condonation and recrimination defenses, 8 and adds
two no-fault grounds. Under the new Ohio no-fault approach, a
1. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page Supp. 1974), enacted as Ohio
S.B. 348, (110th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. 1973-74); §§ 2301.03, 3101.04,
3101.05, 3105.01, 3105.03, 3105.10, 3105.17, 3105.18, 3109.04, 3109.05,
3105.091, 3105.21, 3105.61, 3105.62, 3105.63, 3105.64, 3105.65 enacted as
Ohio H.B. 233 (110th Gen. Assembly, Regular Sess. 1973-74).
2. OHio R-v. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page Supp. 1974) provides:
The court of common pleas may grant divorces for the following
causes:
(A) Either party had a husband or wife living at the time of
the marriage from which the divorce is sought;





(G) Any gross neglect of duty;
(H) Habitual drunkenness;
(I) Imprisonment of the adverse party in a state or federal penal
institution under sentence thereto at the time of filing the petition;
(J) Procurement of a divorce without this state, by a husband
or wife, by virtue of which the party who procured it is released from
the obligations of the marriage, while such obligations remain bind-
ing upon the other party ....
This section includes six fault grounds: (B), (C), (E), (G), (H), (I);
three annulment grounds: (A), (D), (F); and a provision authorizing the
court to grant a divorce to any resident party whose husband or wife shall
have obtained a divorce in any other state: (J).
3. Id. § 3105.10(B).
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divorce may be granted to a couple who have lived separate and
apart without cohabitation for 2 years4 or who have agreed to a
dissolution of their marriage and have bilaterally settled all financial
and child custody issues. 5
The addition of the two no-fault provisions is the most important
of the recent revisions and offers a radically different method of ter-
minating a marriage in Ohio. This fundamental reform reflects a
legislative awareness that continuation of marriages that have ceased
to exist in fact is against society's best interests. 6 Under the former
total fault-based system, if a court could not find one spouse at fault
and the other innocent of marital wrongdoing, a divorce would not
be granted even though the marriage relationship had completely dis-
integrated. In order to obtain a divorce decree, the parties often
resorted to either migratory divorces or collusive lawsuits. 7 Ohio's
new divorce statute now provides two grounds under which evidence
of marital misconduct is irrelevant to divorce proceedings and under
which the parties, not the court, bear the initial burden of determin-
ing whether a divorce is warranted.
These no-fault provisions add greater flexibility to the fault-based
structure which was maintained by the legislature. Several options
are now open to the parties, who may choose the one best suited
to their circumstances. 8 As a result couples seeking to avoid adver-
sary fault-based proceedings will no longer be forced to travel out
4. Id. § 3105.01(K).
The court of common pleas may grant divorces for the following
causes:
On the application of either party, when husband and wife have,
-without interruption for two years, lived separate and apart without
cohabitation, and four years in the case in which one of the parties
is continually confined to a mental institution. A plea of res judicata
or of recrimination with respect to any provision of this section does
not bar either party from obtaining a divorce on this ground.
5. ld. § 3105.61 provides: "Tne court of common pleas may grant a dis-
solution of marriage." The dissolution of marriage action is covered in full
by id. §§ 3105.61-.65.
6. See Comment, The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in Cali-
fornia Divorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1306, 1312 (1970).
7. See Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L.
REv. 32, 33-35 (1966).
8. One Ohio commentator has noted an increase -in the number of ways
in which parties can terminate their marriage as a result of the 1974 reforms.
Before 1974 there were only three methods of terminating a marriage in Ohio:
(1) annulment, (2) divorce upon fault grounds, and (3) death of one of the
spouses. Two new no-fault provisions and the statutory abolition of recrimi-
nation have increased the number of methods to at least six: (1) annulment,
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of state or to perjure themselves in order to obtain divorce decrees.
Parties who wish to contest both the divorce and the collateral issues9
may still resort to a fault-based proceeding.' 0 Spouses who do not
wish to contest the divorce," but who wish to dispute the collateral
issues, may proceed under the living apart provision. 12 Finally, par-
ties who agree to divorce and who agree to all the collateral issues
may bring an action for dissolution of the marriage.
II. OHio's DUAL DIVORCE SYSTEM: FAULT AND NO-FAULT
A. Recrimination and the Fault System
The fault system of divorce in Ohio is similar to that of other
states.' 8 In an adversary proceeding the innocent plaintiff spouse
must prove the guilt of the defendant based upon one of the statutory
fault grounds.' 4 Certain common law defenses are available to the
defendant to combat these charges. Among these defenses are those
that allow the defendant spouse to produce evidence that the plaintiff
has agreed to fabricate grounds for divorce, consented to defendant's
marital wrongdoing, or forgiven an aot of marital indiscretion.' 5
The more important defense of recrimination permits proof by
the defendant that the plaintiff has engaged in marital misconduct
sufficient to constitute grounds for divorce. The effect of this theory,
which is an outgrowth of the equitable doctrine of clean hands,16 is
(2) dissolution of marriage by agreement, (3) divorce upon fault grounds, (4)
divorce upon mutual fault, (5) divorce without fault by living separate and
apart, and (6) death of one of the spouses. J. MILLIGAN, OHno PRAMCE, Vols.
13 & 14: F m.,y LAw 111 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MILLIGAN].
9. Collateral issues can include any of the following: property division,
alimony, child support, and child custody.
10. It is not necessary for -two spouses to contest both the divorce and the
collateral issues in order to employ the traditional fault procedure. A party
may simply choose to contest the divorce itself.
11. There are two meanings that can be given to a "contested" or "dis-
puted" divorce proceeding. The first applies these words to a disagreement
over which party was at fault and the second to a disagreement over factual
issues without regard to fault. Thus, a complaint based on the living apart
provision may be "contested" on the factual ground 'that the parties have not
lived separate and apart for the required period of 2 years, but may not be
"contested" on the theory that the plaintiff was at fault.
12. Omo REv. CODE AN. § 31105.01 (K) (Page Supp. 1974).
13. Rose, Non-Fault Divorce in Ohio, 31 Omo ST. LJ. 52, 55 (1970).
14. See note 2 supra.
15. See note 22 infra. For a general discussion of the theories of collu-
sion, connivance, and condonation see H. CLARK, DoMasTic RELATIONS §§
12.8-.10, at 358-70 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK].
16. For a discussion as to whether the doctrine of recrimination was
[VoL 25:844
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to preclude both parties from obtaining a divorce if each spouse es-
tablishes that the other has committed a marital offense.17 The un-
desirable result of the recrimination doctrine is that two spouses can
be trapped in their marriage with no effective means of legal ter-
mination of their obligations.
Recrimination became recognized as a device used unjustly to
punish two hopelessly estranged spouses,' 8 and the fear arose that
it might be applied even more expansively by the courts. .If the
courts were to apply the doctrine rigidly whenever the opportunity
to do so arose, many more dead marriages would be perpetuated.
Some state courts, recognizing the potential problems of the recrim-
ination defense, plainly announced their opposition to mechanical
application of the doctrine. The California Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, in 1952 in the landmark case of DeBurgh v. DeBurgh'9
stated:
The chief vice of the rule [of recrimination] .. . is
its failure to recognize -that the considerations of policy that
prompt the state to consent to a divorce when one spouse
has been guilty of misconduct are often doubly present
when both spouses have been guilty . . . . It is a degra-
dation of marriage and a frustration of its purposes when
the courts use it as a device for punishment.20
Since DeBurgh many state legislatures have abolished recrimination
by statute.21 The Ohio legislature followed this trend by incorpo-
rating into its recent divorce reforms section 3105.10(B), which pro-
vides that "A plea of. . .recrimination is not a bar to a divorce. ' 22
rooted in the equitable theory of clean hands in Ohio, see Note, The Status
of Recrimination as a Defense to Divorce Actions in Ohio, 18 W. R.s. L. REv.
1330, 1339-42 (1967).
17. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 41. Recrimination has been criticized
by questioning whether there can ever be a party totally free from fault in
a divorce proceeding. See Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11
Tum. L. REv. 377, 383-84 (1937).
18. Id.
19. 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952).
20. Id. at 864, 250 P.2d at 601. At least two Ohio lower courts have rec-
ognized the problems inherent in a broad application of the recrimination de-
fense and have attempted to develop limitations to its use on the basis of equi-
table considerations. Newell v. Newell, 23 Ohio App. 2d 149, 261 N.E.2d 278
(1970); Bales v. Bales, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 387, 294 N.E.2d 252 (C.P. Lake
County 1971).
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.044 (Supp. 1974); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANNt. § 3.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 1974); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.18 (Supp.
1974).
22. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.10(B) (Page Supp. 1974). Condona-
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This statutory language makes clear that proof by both parties
of the other's wrongdoing is not a bar to divorce. The issue remains,
however, what procedure courts should follow when both parties are
found at fault. In some jurisdictions where the doctrine of recrim-
ination is not recognized, the theory of comparative rectitude has
provided a solution. This theory permits a court to weigh the evi-
dence where both parties are guilty of marital misconduct sufficient
to constitute separate grounds for divorce and to grant a divorce to
the party who is found least at fault.23 Several Ohio decisions, how-
ever, have rejected this solution. 24 Although -these cases were de-
cided while recrimination remained a bar to divorce, they might still
be followed in spite of the abolition of the doctrine. If Ohio courts
continue to reject this doctrine,2 5 a solution, adopted by a number
tion, also abolished in Ohio by § 3105.10(B), was another affirmative defense
that operated to bar spouses whose marriage had ceased to exist in fact from
obtaining a decree of divorce. Condonation meant that a brief period of rec-
onciliation, sometimes even cohabitation for one night, operated to forgive all
previous misconduct. See, e.g., Duff v. Duff, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 496, 126 N.E.2d
466 (Ct. App. 1954). The effect of condonation was to prevent the forgiven
misconduct from being pleaded as a ground for divorce. See, e.g., Wilson v.
Wilson, 14 Ohio App. 2d 148, 237 N.E.2d 421 (1968). The existence of con-
donation, though the doctrine was rarely invoked by Ohio courts, served to dis-
courage honest attempts at reconciliation.
The abolition of both recrimination and condonation defenses by the legis-
lature is in accordance with the recommendations made by the draftsmen of
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. UNwoRm MARRIAG AND DIVORCE
A"" § 303(e).
23. CLARK § 12.12, at 377. See, e.g., Ayers v. Ayers, 226 Ark. 394, 290
S.W.2d 24 (1956); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d 366
(1953).
24. See, e.g., Sandrene v. Sandrene, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 481, 121 N.E.2d 324
(Ct. App. 1952); Keath v. Keath, 78 Ohio App. 517, 71 N.E.2d 520 (1946);
Veler v. Veler, 57 Ohio App. 155, 12 N.E.2d 783 (1935); Cowgill v. Cowgill,
84 Ohio L. Abs. 406, 171 N.E.2d 769 (C.P. Highland County), rev'd on other
grounds, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 138, 172 N.E.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1960).
25. Since the abolition of recrimination marks the demise of the notion
that only a party innocent of marital misconduct can ,be granted a divorce,
the main reason why Ohio courts might reject the doctrine of comparative rec-
titude stems from the problems inherent in trying to assess degrees of marital
fault. As the court noted in Keath, "Logic cannot permit the weighing of the
quantum of guilt and award 'the divorce to the one less guilty ..... 78 Ohio
App. 517, 520, 71 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1946).
In spite of this serious problem in quantification, there are some indications
that Ohio courts may adopt a theory of comparative rectitude. See MILLIGAN,
107 n.11, 111. See also the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Do-
mestic Relations, made before the divorce reforms were enacted, that the Gen-
eral Assembly "[aldopt a 'comparative fault' concept, by abolishing . . . re-
crimination . . . as [a defense] to divorce." JoiNT COMM. ON DoMESTc RE-
[Vol 25:844
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of other states, 28 would be to grant a dual decree of divorce.27
B. The Advantages of the No-Fault System Over Total
Fault-Based Divorce
The problems arising from recrimination are not the only short-
comings of a statutory approach to divorce based entirely upon find-
ings of fault. For example, a list of fault guidelines implies that a
marriage can only break down for one of the statutory reasons. In
reality, marriages often deteriorate for a variety of reasons not
enumerated in a list of fault grounds. 28 Furthermore, reliance on
a total fault-based system of divorce may serve to promote the occur-
rence of marital misbehavior. Denial of a divorce to the parties for
failure to prove one of the statutory grounds may lead to desertion
or, where the couple decides to continue living together, to extra-
marital sexual relations, alcoholism, or violent behavior.29
No-fault divorce provides a more flexible type of relief for
estranged spouses whose marital situation may not fit into the -rigid
framework of traditional fault-based proceedings. Under the new
Ohio approach, the parties may now obtain a divorce by presenting
to the court faotual evidence that they have lived separate and apart
without cohabitation for 2 years or that they have agreed to a resolu-
tion of the collateral issues and are applying for a dissolution of -their
marriage. Neither the parties nor the court need speculate as to
why the marriage has broken down in order for a divorce decree
to be granted. Once a party proves that his or her marriage is de-
funct, a divorce decree will be issued. That one of the parties
caused the fall of the -relationship is immaterial and, hence, not sub-
ject to proof.
A second problem inherent in divorce systems in which fault is
the sole criterion is that the state alone decides what conduct justifies
divorce. The fact that the state makes this decision encourages par-
LATIONS, REPORT TO THE 109TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY PURSUANT TO H.J. Rrs.
No. 38 or? THE 108TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 233 Cal. App. 2d 569, 43 Cal. Rptr. 811
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Burns v. Bums, 145 Mont. 1, 40G P.2d 642 (1965);
Akins v. Akins, 51 Wash. 2d 887, 322 P.2d 872 (1958).
27. Judge Milligan suggests both solutions: "The court is granted enor-
mous direction by § 3105.10(B). Thus, where both parties are guilty of mis-
conduct sufficient to constitute grounds for divorce, the court may grant a di-
vorce -to both parties, or one of the parties, even though the other does not
want a divorce." MiLLiGAN 107 n.11.
28. Wadlington, supra note 7, at 82.
29. Id. at 83.
15753
850 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ties to think in terms of "Can I get a divorce?" rather than "Should
I get a divorce?" Here too, the availability of no-fault divorce
grounds has great merit. It forces the parties themselves to
weigh the strengths and weaknesses of the marriage before de-
ciding whether to reconcile their differences or to seek a divorce.30
By shifting a greater share of the responsibility for termination of
the marriage onto the parties themselves, no-fault grounds may cause
the individuals to study their situations more carefully and thus ac-
tually prevent some unnecessary divorce actions from being
brought.31
Still another problem caused by divorce systems based upon total
fault is that of collusive lawsuits and migratory divorces. Since fault
grounds do not comprehensively cover the possible situations in
which a divorce may be warranted, certain methods of circumventing
the fault-based system have become prevalent. There are two types
of collusion in which desperate spouses, who may have no other re-
course in the courts, normally engage. One type occurs when the
parties agree not to contest a divorce action . 2  The second type of
complicity arises when one party agrees to commit perjury by plead-
ing guilty to a relatively minor divorce offense.33 Furthermore, par-
ties who reside in a state with a total fault-based system of divorce
may decide that they wish to avoid an adversary proceeding in their
own state and may resort to another state's divorce laws to obtain
the decree. These migratory divorces are made possible by states
with relatively short residency requirements and lenient grounds for
divorce. 34
No-fault divorce laws, however, consider the reasons for marital
breakdown to be unimportant and therefore help to eliminate the
need for collusive and migratory divorces. Since the no-fault laws
focus on the question of whether the marriage has in fact ceased to
exist, the gap between legal theory and social reality is considerably
30. Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model
Statute and Commentary, 3 FAMILY L.Q. 75, 83 (1969).
31. Id.
32. CtAman § 12.9. Over 90 percent of all divorce proceedings nationally
are uncontested. M. PLOscowE, H. FoSTR= & D. FREED, FAMILY LAw: CASES
AND MATERIALs 344 (2d ed. 1972). Of course, it is impossible to ascertain
what percentage of these uncontested cases are collusive.
33. Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in
Respomse to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAMmY L. 267, 269 (1971); Zuckman
& Fox, The Ferment in Divorce Legislation, 12 J. FAMiLY L. 515, 525 (1973).
34. M. PLoscowE, THE TRUTH ABoUT DIVORCE 151-52 (1955); cf. In
re Feltman, 51 N.J. 27, 237 A.2d 473 (1968).
[Vol. 25:844
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narrowed. No-fault actions can be relatively simple, nonadversary
proceedings and can discourage parties from turning to extraordinary
means for obtaining a divorce. No-fault divorce will eliminate the
incentives for much of the perjury and hypocrisy present in total
fault-based proceedings and aid considerably in restoring the public
confidence in the state courts.
Another shortcoming of total fault-based proceedings is that they
often serve to exacerbate the aggressive forces that may already be
undermining the family. One marriage counselor has stated that
"there is a far greater amount of anger between the parties at the
end of the legal proceedings than there was actually at the time they
made the decision to divorce." 35 Hostility is an unavoidable element
of fault-based proceedings because the stakes are high. The party
labeled "at fault" may be subjected to social stigma as well as the
loss of property and custodial rights. Given the great risks of being
found to be at fault, the pressures inherent in a divorce fault contest
may inhibit the development of amicable relationships after the di-
vorce between the spouses as well as between the parents and the
children.
Ohio's two no-fault grounds will do much to eliminate the court-
room battles characteristic of fault-based proceedings." The dis-
solution of marriage action is based on a separation agreement signed
by both parties. Disagreement may enter the dissolution proceed-
ings only if a party voices dissatisfaction with the agreement at the
time of the final hearing. 7 .In such a case, further negotiations may
be undertaken to work out an amicable resolution of the differences
generating the dissatisfaction. In the living separate and apart ac-
tion, one may dispute3 8 whether the parties "have, without interrup-
tion for two years, lived separate and apart without cohabitation.13 9
While a dispute of this nature may engender some bitterness, it cer-
tainly cannot compare with that so frequently resulting from a fault
divorce.
35. Hearings on Domestic Relations Before the Assembly Interim Comm.
on Judiciary, California Assembly 42 (Jan. 8-9, 1964), quoted in Rose, supra
note 13, at 57-58.
36. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3105.63 (Page Supp. 1974). Section 3105.62
also provides an indication of the nonadversary nature of dissolutions: "For
purposes of service of process, both parties in an action for dissolution of mar-
riage shall be deemed to be defendants ... " Id. § 3105.62.
37. Id. § 3105.63 (A).
38. See note 11 supra.
39. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(K) (Page Supp. 1974).
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C. The Advantages of Ohio's Fault-No-Fault System
Instead of completely repealing all fault-based grounds for di-
vorce and enacting a comprehensive no-fault statute,40 the Ohio
General Assembly has appended two no-fault provisions onto the
existing fault grounds for divorce. The legislature's reluctance to
adopt a total no-fault system can be explained in part by the rela-
tively unproved status of other comprehensive no-fault legislation. 4
1
One principal reason for a lack of confidence in total no-fault divorce
systems is the absence of statutory guidelines for defining -the stand-
ards by which marital breakdown is to be determined. 42  Further-
more, the continuing emergence of the traditional characteristics of
fault-based actions, such as introduction of evidence of marital mis-
conduct4 3 or collusion,44 in no-fault proceedings suggests that total
no-fault divorce legislation has not completely eliminated the ills of
its predecessor statutes.
Total no-fault divorce also acts to diminish the parties' legal pro-
tection. Under a pure no-fault system, serious marital offenders,
spouses who may have substantially wronged their marital partners
40. A comprehensive no-fault statute refers to a statute similar to Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act § 305. For a number of similar statutes see Zuck-
man & Fox, supra note 33, at 558.
41. For a discussion of some of the short-term effects of total no-fault sys-
tems see Zuckman & Fox, supra note 33, at 581-85.
42. See M. RnmrNsTmN, MARR GE STABiLITY, DIvoRcE, AND THE LAW 385
(1972); Zuckman & Fox, supra note 33, at 595. The California example best
illustrates the broad discretion given divorce courts in total no-fault divorce ju-
risdictions. Since 1970, California has required that a decree of dissolution
of the marriage relationship be grounded on either "(1) [i]rreconciliable dif-
ferences which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage" or
"(2) [i]ncurable insanity." CAL. CIv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). "Irrecon-
ciliable differences" are defined by statute as "those grounds which are deter-
mined by the court to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage
and which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved." Id. § 4507.
Although California's first ground for dissolution establishes no clear rules
or guidelines to aid judicial determination of what constitutes irreconcilable
differences, § 4506 has been found not to be unconstitutional because of uncer-
tainty or ambiguity. In re Marriage of Cosgrove, 27 Cal. App. 3d 424, 103
Cal. Rptr. 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
43. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1318-23.
44. In re Marriage of McKim, 6 Cal. 3d 673, 493 P.2d 868, 100 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1972). In McKim, the California Supreme Court held that under the
California dissolution of marriage statute, it was not proper for parties to pre-
sent false evidence collusively that their differences were irreconcilable and that
their marriage had irremediably broken down. The court reasoned that while
the primary goal of the no-fault statute was to make dissolution actions as non-
adversary as possible, such proceedings should not become perfunctory because
[Vol. 25:844
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without provocation, may escape all legal sanctions.45 Thus, an in-
nocent spouse may be unable to recover the damages he or she has
incurred through the malicious activities of the defendant spouse.
This undesirable result may account for the avoidance of complete
no-fault divorce by most state legislatures.46
Ohio's new dual divorce system represents a legislative effort to
avoid the problems of a pure no-fault system. *While the new Ohio
law will produce the usual number of interpretative problems arising
from any new statute, 47 no inherently vague standard such as "ir-
reconcilable differences" exists to cause the ever-present problems
faced by complete no-fault jurisdictions. The living separate and
apart action requires courts to make three relatively straightforward
factual inquiries: (1) whether the spouses have lived separate and
apart (2) without cohabitation (3) for 2 years. 48 The dissolution
of marriage action is essentially a divorce by agreement, only re-
quiring that the procedural rules of the statute be followed.
Ohio's new system of divorce will also deter a spouse from en-
gaging in connubial misconduct injurious to his or her marital part-
ner. Should a spouse seeking a divorce through the dissolution or
living apart actions engage in marital misconduct sufficient to consti-
tute fault under the retained grounds, the wronged spouse can easily
switch to a cause of action based on fault grounds. For instance,
one spouse might decide to take advantage of the last year of the
2-year period necessary for a living apart divorce by engaging in a
meretricious relationship. Under Ohio's present mixed fault-no-fault
structure, a party would reconsider before incurring the wrath of his
soon to be estranged spouse and possibly subjecting himself or herself
to guilt in a fault proceeding. Thus, Ohio's combination of fault and
no-fault divorce provisions provides a safeguard against possible
abuse of its new no-fault provisions and preserves the state's interest
in preventing marital misconduct during the cooling-off period.4 9
'A final advantage of Ohio's reforms is that the state bench and
of the absence of one party unless "exceptional circumstances" justified that
party's absence to the satisfaction of the court. Id. at 682, 493 P.2d at 874,
100 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
45. See Schwartz, The Seriouas Marital Offendee: Tort Law as a Solution,
6 FAMnY L.Q. 219, 220-21 (1972).
46. Id.
47. For a treatment of the interpretative problems in the living apart pro-
vision see notes 75-119 infra and accompanying text.
48. MmLIGAN 106 n.6.
49. The cooling-off period for the living apart provision is 2 years. OmIo
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854 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
bar can be gradually educated in concepts of no-fault through the
use of the living apart and dissolution statutes before the state's laws
are wholly committed to a total no-fault standard. While many
problems remain with total no-fault divorce, 50 it probably represents
an important step in the course of divorce law reform.5 1 Ohio's ad-
dition of no-fault provisions to a fault structure may pave the way
for the orderly abolition of fault grounds and the adoption of a com-
prehensive no-fault statute that has proved reliable elsewhere. Ohio
could thus reap the benefits of the experience of other states while
avoiding many of the problems associated with the pioneering of total
no-fault efforts.
I1. THE LIVING APART ,PROVISION-SUBPARAGRAPH K
A. Description and Benefits
Ohio's living apart provision which became effective on May 7,
1974,52 states that the common pleas court may grant divorces
"[o]n the application of either party, when husband and wife have,
without interruption for two years, lived separate and apart without
cohabitation. . ... 5 The statute is based upon the theory that
proof that a husband and wife have lived apart for a long period
of time is the best evidence that a marriage has broken down.54
Harm to the parties and their children by the forced continuation
of a marital bond that has long since ceased to exist in fact is thus
avoided. 55
REv. CoDE ANN. § 3105.01(K) (Page Supp. 1974). The dissolution of mar-
riage action requires a waiting period of from 30 to 90 days. Id. § 3105.64.
The purpose of the cooling-off period is to provide time for the parties to
reconsider their relationship and seek reconciliation. See Pashko v. Pashko,
45 Ohio Op. 498, 101 N.E.2d 804 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1951).
50. For some problems arising under California's no-fault statute see
Comment, supra note 6, at -1318-31.
51. As of June 1, 1974, only Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Pennsyl-
vania, and South Dakota maintain total fault-based divorce systems. Freed,
Grounds for Divorce in the American Jurisdictions, 8 FAMrLY L.Q. 401, 421
(1975).
52. O1no Rav. CODE AiN. § 3105.01(K) (Page Supp. 1974).
53. Id.
54. The bill's sponsor, Representative Alan E. Norris, has written that
"'[tihe practical effect of this provision is to define a marriage which is beyond
saving; where one spouse has absented himself for two years, the possibility
of reconciliation is remote indeed." Norris, Divorce Reform: Ohio's Alterna-
tive to No-Fault, 48 STATE GOV'T 52, 54 (1975). See also Parks v. Parks,
116 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940).




Although the provision makes a major departure from past Ohio
law, it is not without precedent in other states.56 The living apart
ground has been called "[bly far the most widespread and influen-
tial" no-fault ground found in essentially fault-based systems of
divorce.57 There are, however, a number of statutory variants.58
The narrowest type of living apart provision permits a divorce only
when the parties have obtained a separation or separate maintenance
decree and have lived apart under the decree for a prescribed length
of time.59 A second, broader category allows divorce only when the
couple has voluntarily agreed to live apart for the statutory pe-
riod.6o A third modification of the provision authorizes a divorce
only if the plaintiff spouse is innocent of any wrongdoing.61 Finally,
the least restrictive and most widely enacted 62 'type of living apart
provision grants a divorce upon mere proof that the parties have
been disassociated for the requisite period. The new Ohio statute
exemplifies this last version.
The primary difference among the four variants of the living
apart laws lies in the significance that each attaches to the issue of
fault.6 3 The type that is based upon a separation decree and a sub-
sequent period of living apart is closely tied to traditional fault con-
cepts since one of the spouses must establish a fault ground before
the initial separation decree will be granted. 64 Secondly, the volun-
tary living apart provision requires that the separation be agreed
upon by both of the parties, be continuous from the inception of the
statutory period, and be final.65 A consequence of the mutual con-
sent requirement, however, is that one party, by simply refusing to
56. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(11) (Supp. 1970); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 138(9) (Supp. 1974); Mn-N. SrAT. ANN. § 518.06(8) (Supp.
1974); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 170(5)-(6) (McKinney Supp. 1974). Some
states had statutes with living apart provisions before the turn of the century.
See Wadlington, supra note 7, at 63 & n.139.
57. Zuckman & Fox, supra note 33, at 546. In some states, the living
separate and apart provision accounts for more than half of all divorces, but
in the country as a whole fewer than 10 percent of all divorces are granted
on this ground. H. JAcoBsoN, AMERCAN MAUAGE AND DVORcE 125 (1959).
58. Zuckman & Fox, supra note 33, at 547.
59. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.07(7) (Supp. 1974).
60. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522(11) (Supp. 1970).
61. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-47 (Supp. 1973).
62. See note 67 infra.
63. CLmK § 12.6, at 352.
64. Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. Rav.
32, 55 (1966). See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(8) (Smith Supp. 1973).
65. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, 75 Nev. 304, 340 P.2d 581 (1959);
Hahn v. Hahn, 192 Md. 561, 64 A.2d 739 (1949); France v. Safe Deposit &
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agree, can coerce his or her spouse either into remaining legally mar-
ried or into making a greater property settlement. Thus, where one
party is guilty of some wrongdoing, fault can enter into the negotia-
tions and can be used inequitably to gain a bargaining advantage.
Finally, the role played by fault in the third modification, which re-
quires the plaintiff to be innocent of any marital misconduct, 66 is
manifest. An inquiry into the plaintiff's fault is central to this ap-
proach.
Under Ohio's living apart provision, 67 however, evidence of
marital fault is irrelevant, since a divorce will be granted where a
period of continuous living apart without cohabitation has been con-
clusively established by the parties. The statute is designed to facili-
tate legal termination of marriages that have ceased to function in
fact. s As one expert has observed, "The best test of whether
Trust Co., 176 Md. 306, 4 A.2d 717 (1939). If the spouses part because
of necessity, (e.g., if one spouse is imprisoned or required to perform military
service) the resulting separation is not a cause for divorce in a jurisdiction
where a voluntary living apart provision has been enacted. However, the
agreement to terminate a marital relationship can become voluntary during a
forced absence if one party expresses the wish that the marriage be terminated.
Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 1089, 26 So. 2d 146, 148 (1946).
66. Prior to 1969, Vermont had a living apart provision that was inter-
preted to require the plaintiff to allege and affirmatively establish that he had
no part in causing the separation. See Krupp v. Krupp, 126 Vt. 511, 236 A.2d
653 (1967); West v. West, 115 Vt. 458, 63 A.2d 864 (1949). The Vermont
legislature later enacted § 511(7), which provides that a divorce may be
granted where two spouses live apart continuously for a period of 6 consecutive
months and "the court finds that the resumption of marital relations is not
reasonably probable." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7) (1974).
Wyoming is one state that retains a living apart provision wherein the party
at fault is barred from obtaining a divorce. The statute provides in part that
a divorce may be obtained "when the husband and wife have lived apart for
two consecutive years without cohabitation but not upon such ground if such
separation has been induced or justified by cause chargeable in whole or ma-
terial part to the party seeking divorce upon such grounds in the action." Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 20-47 (1957). In contrast to the procedure required by the prior
Vermont statute, the Wyoming Supreme Court held in Dawson v. Dawson, 62
Wyo. 519, 177 P.2d 200 (1947), that the burden of proof rests with the de-
fendant to prove plaintiff's fault.
67. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(K) (Page Supp. 1974). At least
seven other jurisdictions have enacted statutes with living apart provisions that
by express language or by judicial construction are no-fault in nature: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1202(7) (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-610 (1963);
KY. RV. STAT. ANN. § 403.020(1)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1973); P.R. LAws ANN.
tit. 31, § 321(9) (Supp. 1974); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.06 (Vernon's 1973);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Supp. 1974); WASH. Rnv. CODE § 26.08.020(9)
(1961).
68. Norris, supra note 54, at 54.
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[a] marriage is dead is a suitable period of living apart .... ."69
In addition, if the cooling-off period is reasonable, 70 both parties are
afforded an opportunity for reconciliation to insure against hasty ac-
tion.
The major practical problem for Ohio's no-fault living apart pro-
vision will be to avoid the injection of fault concepts through the
persistence of the traditional thinking of the legislature, the bar, and
the courts. 71 Where, as in Ohio, fault grounds are retained, the re-
surgence of fault in no-fault living apart actions becomes a difficult
problem to solve. 72 For example, although the issue of fault will
be irrelevant to the award of divorce itself, it will assume major
significance in the same proceedings where collateral matters such
as alimony must be litigated.73 Thus, the elimination of the concept
of fault from no-fault living apart actions may become, as one com-
mentator has suggested, "a choice between letting the parties reach
their own financial agreements or litigating the question of fault
separately for alimony purposes. '74 The removal of fault considera-
tions from living apart actions will take place gradually as the judi-
ciary gains awareness and experience in no-fault concepts. The proc-
ess will, unfortunately, take time.
69. Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, 7 FAMmY L.Q. 169, 171 (1969).
70. See text accompanying notes 104-09 infra.
71. Walker, supra note 33, at 293. This problem is illustrated by the fact
that three types of living apart provisions include considerations of fault,
wholly or in part. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra. As -to .the fourth
(Ohio) type of living apart provision, Walker notes that "[alithough it may
be too early to draw definitive conclusions .. it appears that ... non-fault
grounds may have ,been subsumed by the fault-based orientations of the existing
structure they were designed to cure." Id. at 293.
72. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J.
FAMILY L. 179, 209 (1968).
73. See Zuckman & Fox, supra note 33, at 551. Although fault considera-
tions are specifically excluded from child support determinations, fault is still
important in alimony and child custody decisions. OHo Rnv. CODE ANN. §
3109.05 (Page Supp. 1974). See, e.g., Rabin v. Rabin, 118 Ohio App. 446,
195 N.E.2d 377 (1962) (alimony); In re Kincaid, 33 Ohio Op. 311, 45 Ohio
L. Abs. 340 (P. Ct. 1946) (fault evidence relevant in child custody disputes
only where the fitness of the parent is an issue). Thus, the parties may be
gianted a divorce on the basis of the living apart provision without regard to
marital misconduct, but must still introduce fault evidence in order to obtain
a proper alimony award or child custody decision.
74. Wadlington, supra note 64, at 79. An alternative solution would be
the elimination of all fault concepts from collateral matters.
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B. Problems of Statutory Interpretation
1. Retroactivity
An immediate, although temporary, issue to be faced by Ohio
courts will be whether the living apart provision should be applied
retroactively so that time spent by parties living apart prior to the
enactment date will be included in the statutory period. To date,
no Ohio court has confronted this issue.75  Other states have held
that separation periods may begin prior -to the effective date of legisla-
tion.76 Such a construction is desirable since it more rapidly effectu-
ates the implicit legislative purpose of legally terminating marriages
which are, in reality, dead. 77  The 2-year statutory period is a reli-
able indication of this marital collapse regardless of when it started.
To require that it begin again on the effective date of the legislation
would only cause some defunct marriages to be needlessly prolonged.
Constitutional objections 78 to retroactive application may arise on
the theory that a spouse would be deprived of certain rights without
due process of law. 79 An overwhelming number of cases, however,
75. The Ohio Supreme Court has faced a similar issue in Scott v. Scott,
6 Ohio 534 (1834), -where it was held that an act of the legislature making
habitual drunkenness for 3 years a ground for divorce did not apply retroac-
tively. For other cases that reject retrospective application, see Pierce v.
Pierce, 107 Wash. 125, 181 P. 24 (1919); Jarvis v. Jarvis, 3 Edw. Ch. 462
(N.Y. 1841); Sherburne v. Sherburne, 6 Me. 210 (1829).
76. See, e.g., Gerdts v. Gerdts, 196 Minn. 599, 265 N.W. 811 (1936);
Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933). See also note 80 infra.
77. The retroactive application of the provision would also be consistent
with the grammatical structure of the living apart provision itself. Section
3105.01(K) provides that a divorce may be granted when the parties "have
... lived separate and apart. .. ." Omno Rnv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(K)
(Page Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). See Note, Retroactive Application of
New Grounda for Divorce Under § 170 Domestic Relations Law, 17 Butri'.o
L. REv. 902, 911 (1968). A Louisiana court has recognized that the statutory
period applies both to past years and time since the statute has been enacted
where the applicable statute expressly states that a divorce may be granted
where the husband and wife have been living apart without cohabitation.
Hurry v. Hurry, 141 La. 954, 76 So. 160 (1917) (emphasis added). The court
observed at one point that "[t]o construe the act to mean what is contended
for by the defendant, the legislature should have said, 'That when married per-
sons shall hereafter live separate and apart for a period of seven years or more'
• . .or words of similar import (emphasis added)." Id. at 955, 76 So. at 161.
78. An early Supreme Court case decided that the marriage contract is
technically a status and therefore is not covered by the Constitution under the
impairment of the obligations of contract clause. Maynard v. Hill, '125 U.S.
190 (1888).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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suggests that no real constitutional obstacle remains -to retroactive ap-
plication of living apart provisions.8 0 While no Ohio court has yet
faced this issue, the logic used in cases elsewhere is equally applic-
able in Ohio. In the case of Fuqua v. Fuqua,81 for example, the
Alabama Supreme Court, in interpreting a statute that provided for
the conversion of a limited divorce decree into an absolute divorce
after more -than 4 years' separation, held that marital status was not a
vested right protected from retroactive application by the state con-
stitution.
In addition to marital status, certain property rights arising out
of the marriage may be affected by the retroactive application of
the living apart provisions. If such property rights are not vested
however, there appears to be no valid constitutional objection. In
Gleason v. Gleason,8 2 retroactive operation of New York's conver-
sion statute 3 was challenged on the ground that such a construction
would eliminate social security, pension, and inheritance benefits that
the wife would otherwise obtain. The plaintiff argued that a conver-
sion of her separation decree into one of absolute divorce was a tak-
ing of property without due process of law. The court found that
the right of inheritance did not vest until the death of the husband
and that prospective social security and pension benefits were also in-
choate rights. Because -the state had the power to limit or abolish
rights of succession that had not vested directly,8 4 the court reasoned
that the state could restrict inchoate rights indirectly by creating a
new ground for divorce.8 5 Since no vested rights of the defendants
had been affected adversely, the court concluded that there was no
denial of due process.8 "
2. Retention of the Willful Absence Fault Ground
The retention of the willful absence ground87 may cause some dif-
80. See, e.g., Tipping v. Tipping, 82 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1936); White
v. White, 196 Ark. 29, 116 S.W.2d 616 (1938); Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La.
488, 148 So. 687 (1933); Campbell v. Campbell, 174 Md. 229, 198 A. 414
(1938); State ex rel. Progress v. Court, 53 Nev. 386, 2 P.2d 1048 (1931); Mc-
Ginley v.McGinley, 295 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
81. 268 Ala. 127, 104 So. 2d 925 (1958).
82. 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
83. N.Y. DoM. REL. LUw § 170(5) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
84. Cf. Simons v. Miami Beach Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81., 85 (1965).
85. 26 N.Y.2d 28, 41, 256 N.E.2d 513, 520, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 356
(1970).
86. Id.
87. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(B) (Page Supp. 1974). The ground
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ficulty for Ohio courts presented with the problem whether to apply
the living apart provision or the willful absence provision. The issue
might arise when a defendant spouse files a counterclaim of willful
absence to the plaintiff's petition for divorce based upon the living
apart provision. If such were to occur, should the defense of willful
absence be entertained at all? Policy considerations supporting the
no-fault ground dictate that the counterclaim be dismissed because
the determination of whether a divorce should be granted on living
apart grounds should not be tainted by evidence of fault. 8 One
Ohio commentator on divorce law has written in this regard that:
"The critical issue is whether the parties have lived separate and
apart without cohabitation for the required period of time. If they
have done this, the Legislature is satisfied that the marriage is
finished 'in fact' and should not be continued over the protestation
of the adverse party."89
Thus, where a 1-year willful absence ground continues to co-exist
with a 2-year living apart requirement, a, spouse who has been
deserted may sue for divorce on the fault ground anytime between
the first and second years following the separation. After 2 years
have elapsed, however, either spouse may sue on the no-fault ground,
but the willful absence defense should be prohibited. 90 This result
is just, since -it grants the deserted spouse ample time to bring a fault
action, while it also preserves the no-fault element of the living apart
provision.
3. The Factual Inquiries
By the terms of the living apart provision of the new law, a di-
of willful absence for ;1 year involves five main elements: (1) a continuous
(2) cessation of cohabitation, (3) with intent, (4) against the wishes of the
other spouse, (5) without sufficient cause. Mason v. Mason, 30 Ohio Op. 27,
42 Ohio L. Abs. 286 (C.P. Tuscarawas County 1945). The fault lies in the
adverse party's leaving or constructively evicting the other party. An adverse
party must have "continuously absented himself from the home of the parties
and from plaintiff and, without cause, refused [neglected] to return." C.
MEmR, Omo FAnmy LAw 646 (1963). Ohio courts have also applied the
willful absence ground where there has been no communication of one party's
intention to separate, under circumstances that may constitute gross neglect of
duty. Porter v. Lerch, 129 Ohio St. 47, 193 N.E. 166 (1934).
88. See Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 139 S.E.2d 825 (1965); MELLI-
GAN 106 n.6.
89. MLLiGAN 106 n.6.
90. According to its sponsor, Ohio's no-fault living apart statute was en-
acted to deal in part with the situation where one spouse with punitive intent
is able to entrap a spouse who has been absent -for a number of years by threat-
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vorce may be granted to either spouse who can prove that husband
and wife have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for two
years.91 While these issues of fact appear clear in the abstract, this
clarity disappears when applied to specific situations. It remains for
the courts to define these terms more precisely.
There are several tests that can be used to define the "separate
and apart" criterion. One view is that a divorce can be granted only
when one spouse has been physically removed from the marital
dwelling for the requisite period.9 2 The foundation for this rule is
the common law notion that all appearances to the community of
a union must be extinguished.93 An Alabama court applied this
strict approach to deny a divorce sought under a living apart ground
where the spouses continued to live in the same house, but occupied
separate rooms and did not have sexual relations.9 4 The court
defined living separate and apart as constituting "a complete cessa-
tion of all marital duties and relations between the wife and the hus-
band, and their living separate and apart in such a manner that those
in the neighborhood may see that they are not living together." 95
The primary advantage of this so-called separate roofs doctrine
is the minimization of evidentiary problems in court. However, the
rule can be challenged on the theory that it discriminates against im-
poverished couples. Poor spouses often cannot afford to move from
under the same roof, especially if they live in an area where housing
is scarce. In response to this potential challenge, some courts have
rejected the separate roofs test in favor of a separate lives test.96
Under this standard, a court may grant a divorce even though the
parties live in the same house if there is no evidence of marital rela-
tions having taken place during the prescribed period and if there
are no prospects for the reconciliation of the parties.97
ening to bring a fault action. Norris, supra note 54, at 54. If the living apart
statute were to be construed to permit counterclaims based on willful absence,
not only would its no-fault application be eliminated, but a spouse with a valid
willful absence ground could continue to threaten the guilty spouse to remain
legally married.
91. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(K) (Page Supp. 1974).
92. See, e.g., Oxford v. Oxford, 237 Ark. 384, 373 S.W.2d 707 (1963);
Ratliff v. Ratliff, 312 Ky. 450, 227 S.W.2d 989 (1950).
93. See Adams v. Adams, 89 Idaho 84, 403 P.2d 593 (1965).
94. Rogers v. Rogers, 258 Ala. 477, 63 So. 2d 807 (1953).
95. Id. at 477, 63 So. 2d at 808.
96. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hawkins, 191 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Hurd
v. Hurd, -179 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Boyce v. Boyce, 153 F.2d 229 (D.C.
Cir. 1946).
97. The court in Pedersen v. Pedersen, 107 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
19751
862 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The separate roofs and separate lives tests are not mutually ex-
clusive. One could view the separate lives rule as a specific excep-
tion to the separate roofs doctrine. The primary test would allow
a divorce where the parties prove that they have lived in different
houses. The exception would then allow a divorce where special
circumstances justified the parties' living in the same residence,
where all other evidence indicated that the marital relationship had
ended. By means of such an approach to the interpretation of living
separate and apart, both the goals of requiring reliable but easily
presentable evidence and of eliminating any special burdens on the
poor would be effectuated.
The definition of "without cohabitation" also poses substantial
policy considerations for the courts. Generally, for the purposes of
proof, living apart for the required period establishes a prima facie
case for the plaintiff that the marital problems in question are beyond
resolution.9" Once the fact of separation is established, the burden
shifts to the defendant to show the requisite degree of interruption
necessary to rebut plaintiff's case.99 If the defendant can show that
the statutory period has not been met, the court cannot grant a di-
vorce decree to the plaintiff.
Courts have held that sexual relations between parties seeking
divorce during the statutory period constitutes cohabitation and tolls
the separation period. 00 The rationale behind such a holding is the
alleged state interest in discouraging clandestine rendezvous between
spouses.' 0 ' Such a state interest is wholly contradictory to the con-
comitant state desire to encourage genuine attempts at reconciliation,
said in approving this doctrine that "[clontinued occupancy of the same house
may be evidentiary either of harmonious ... relations or of compelling neces-
sity on the part of one or both of the parties." Id. at 232.
98. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 89 Idaho 84, 403 P.2d 593 (1965).
99. See, e.g., Varnell v. Vamell, 207 Ark. 711, 182 S.W.2d 466 (1944).
The Varnell decision illustrates the inequity of such a strict construction
of the "without cohabitation" requirement. Mr. and Mrs. Vamell separated
in 1934. A 3-year living apart ground was enacted by the Arkansas Legis-
lature in 1939. Because the husband and wife spent two nights together in
an attempted reconciliation in July 1942, Mr. Varnell's suit for divorce in 1943
on the basis of living apart for 3 years was denied. The court held that the
separation was not without cohabitation as required by statute. Id. at 712, 182
S.W.2d at 467.
100. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 89 Idaho 84, 403 P.2d 593 (1965).
101. Occasional weekend visits by a husband who told his wife that after
a divorce was granted they could live together as common law spouses was




an interest that would certainly be furthered by permitting meetings
of the parties. A better approach to the "without cohabitation" issue
is that occasional short visits, even if accompanied by sexual inter-
course, do not toll the statutory period of separation.' 0 2 This test
provides the flexibility necessary to foster good faith attempts to
resolve the marital dispute, but it does not prolong the marriage
should those attempts fail. 10 3 Although the problems of proof are
increased by such a test, the value of encouraging reconciliation and
allowing legal termination of marriages that are in fact beyond repair
is well worth the increased judicial effort. The more rigid alternative
would require the continuation of a dead marriage for an indeter-
minate period, a result detrimental to 'the best interests of both
society and -the parties.
The third factual issue, that of the 2-year mandatory separation
period, presents no problems of interpretation for the courts. There
is no room for variance in the language of the provision. There are,
however, important policy considerations that should be evaluated in
the light of the statutory waiting period. The living apart require-
ment must be long enough to encourage reconciliation but not so long
as to promote the development of meretricious relationships. In
addition, if the statutory period is excessively long, grounds that
afford speedier relief, accompanied by the problems inherent in
fault-based litigation, may supersede living apart actions.' 0 4 Marital
experts believe that increased delay in a divorce action in which there
is little likelihood of reconciliation tends to increase the parties' frus-
tration and to aggravate their situation.' 05 As a result, states with
living apart provisions have displayed a trend toward decreasing the
duration of living apart requirements.' 0 6 The District of Columbia,
for instance, has enacted a 1-year statutory rule,' 0 7 and Vermont has
adopted a 6-month requirement.' 0 8  In view of this trend, the Ohio
legislature should consider adopting a shorter living apart require-
ment.100
102. See, e.g., Ayala v. Ayala, 182 La. 508, 162 So. 59 (1935), where the
evidence disclosed that the husband visited his wife during the statutory period
only for the purpose of requesting her to be lenient on account of his inability
to pay alimony. Divorce was granted to the husband on the basis of a 4-year
separation provision.
103. See Thomas v. Thomas, 58 Wash. 2d 377, 363 P.2d 107 (1961).
104. Bodenheimer, supra note 72, at 208.
105. See M. WHEELER, NO-FAULT DiVORCE 101 (1974).
106. Wadlington, supra note 64, at 85.
107. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-904(a) (1966).
108. VT. SrAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7) (1974).
109. Should Ohio lower its living apart requirement to 1 year, the statutory
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4. The Unilateral Nature of the Living Apart Provision
The language of the living apart provision implicitly recognizes
that a party has the power to withdraw from the marriage unilater-
ally and obtain a divorce decree upon presentation of the proper
evidence even though the other spouse does not want to end the
marriage. Once a plaintiff has proved that the couple have lived
separate and apart without cohabitation for 2 years, a divorce should
be granted. The only additional requirements for applying such an
interpretation would be that the party act freely and intend to end
the marital relationship. 110 This rule effectuates the underlying
policy of no-fault divorce to terminate marriages that have failed in
fact. Where one party, although acting unilaterally, wishes to dis-
continue the marriage, it is logical to conclude that the marital unit
has no chance of survival."' This unilateral construction will allow
a plaintiff who may be guilty of acts that constitute grounds for a
fault divorce to bring an action based on the living apart statute."112
Even if the innocent defendant spouse wishes to remain married, the
divorce should be granted, since evidence of fault is irrelevant to the
no-fault proceeding.
Unilateral application of the living apart ground eliminates many
of the problems that might arise in those situations where divorce
is the preferable solution to marital deterioration caused through no
fault of the parties and where a bilateral dissolution"13 of the
marriage would be unduly difficult to obtain. Such a situation arises
where one spouse is declared insane and is committed to an institu-
tion. To require the remaining partner to continue the marriage
against his or her wishes would be unfair. A fault-based divorce is
not available, insanity not being a statutory ground for fault di-
vorce." 4  Furthermore, the spouse declared insane is incompetent
to give the consent necessary to fulfill the bilateral dissolution re-
period would be equal to that of the willful absence ground. If this change
ever came about, the willful absence provision should be repealed to eliminate
any conflict. See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
110. See Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946).
111. See Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A
Model Statute and Commentary, 3 FAMILY L.Q. 75, 86 (1969).
112. A Wisconsin court in Rooney v. Rooney, 186 Wis. 49, 202 N.W. 143
(1925), disapproved of allowing a guilty spouse to divorce an innocent plain-
tiff: "The contention that a spouse who has thus violated his marital obliga-
tions may convert his own offense into grounds for divorce at his suit . . .
is preposterous." Id. at 50, 202 N.W.2d at 144.
113. See notes 120-46 infra and accompanying text.
114. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.01(A)-(J) (Page Supp. 1974).
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quirements. 115 The Ohio legislature has provided for this situation,
where a couple may be living apart because a spouse is confined to
a mental institution, by making insanity a ground for divorce under
the living apart provision. 116 The statutory period of 4 years is
longer than the usual living apart requirement because of the diffi-
culty of proof, the extreme nature of the disability, and the possibility
of recovery.'
17
Not all absences automatically make the use of the living apart
provision available. Involuntary absences, such as for active military
duty, have not been regarded as triggering the statutory period. The
bare fact that one spouse has been separated from the other for the
statutory period does not constitute a ground for divorce.", It has
been held, however, that the statutory period is not tolled when the
marriage deteriorates during a period of military duty." 9
IV. THE DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ACTION
A. Description and Benefits
The Ohio General Assembly has enacted a second no-fault
remedy that gives the county common pleas court authority to grant
a dissolution of marriage.' 20 The dissolution provision, which
115. Id. § 3105.63.
116. Id. § 3105.01(K). Prior to this enactment, insanity was a defense.
See Heim v. Heim, 35 Ohio App. 408, 172 N.E. 451 (1930).
1,17. See CLAK 328-29 (1968). For an illustration of the problems of
proof inherent in determining whether insanity has become incurable in a given
case, see GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102, at I 11 (Supp. 1974).
118. See Caye v. Caye, 66 Nev. 83, 211 P.2d 252 (1949).
119. See Benson v. Benson, 66 Nev. 94, 204 P.2d 316 (1949). In that case,
a Nevada statute required a 3-year separation, and the parties had lived apart
for 5 years. The court held that the fact that the husband had served in the
Armed Forces for approximately 6 months during that time was not grounds
for denial of divorce. Id.
120. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.61-.65 (Page Supp. 1974).
Sec. 3105.61. The Court of Common Pleas may grant a dissolu-
tion of marriage.
Sec. 3105.62. One of the spouses in an action for dissolution of
marriage shall have been a resident of -the state at least six months
immediately before filing the petition. Actions for dissolution of
marriage shall be brought in the proper county for commencement
of actions pursuant to civil rules. For purposes of service of process,
both parties in an action for dissolution of marriage shall be deemed
to be defendants and subject to service of process as defendants pur-
suant to the Civil Rules.
Sec. 3105.63. A petition for dissolution of marriage shall be
signed by both spouses, and shall have attached and incorporated a
separation agreement agreed to by both spouses. The separation
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represents a unique approach in American jurisdictions, allows a
couple to petition the court to terminate their marriage legally if they
have resolved the collateral issues of property division, alimony, child
support, and child custody.12 1  This provision places the burden of
resolving these problems on the parties themselves; the court merely
determines whether the agreement is satisfactory to both spouses and
then gives its final approval. Once approved by the court, the final
agreement has the same legal effect as a decree of divorce. 122
The mechanics of this "divorce by agreement"'123 are simple.
Once the separation is complete, it is incorporated into the petition
for dissolution. Both spouses and their attorneys must then sign the
petition.' 2 4 By local rule, the court may require That the petition
include a waiver of service of process on the parties, thus vesting
the court with immediate jurisdiction.12 5  Upon receipt of the peti-
tion, the court will schedule a final hearing for not less than 30 nor
more than 90 days after the filing date.' 2 0 The 30-day minimum
agreement shall provide for a division of all property and, if there
are minor children of the marriage, for custody of minor children,
alimony, child support, and visitation rights. An amended separation
agreement may be filed at any time prior to the hearing on the peti-
tion for dissolution of marriage. Upon receipt of a petition for disso-
lution of marriage, the court may cause an investigation to be made
pursuant to Civil Rules.
Sec. 3105.64. Not less than thirty nor more than ninety days af-
ter the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage, both spouses
shall appear before the court and each spouse shall acknowledge un-
der oath that he has voluntarily entered into the separation agreement
appended to the petition, that he is satisfied with its terms, and that
he seeks dissolution of the marriage.
Sec. 3105.65. (A) If at the time of the hearing either spouse is
not satisfied with the separation agreement, or does not wish a disso-
lution of the marriage, the court shall dismiss the petition and refuse
to validate the proposed separation agreement
(B) If, upon review of the testimony of both spouses, and of the
report of the investigator pursuant to civil rules, the court approves
the separation agreement and any amendments thereto agreed upon
by the parties, it shall grant a decree of dissolution of marriage in-
corporating the separation agreement. A decree of dissolution of
marriage has the same effect upon the property rights of the parties,
including rights of dower and inheritance, as a decree of divorce.
The court has full power to enforce its decree, and retains jurisdiction
to modify all matters of custody, child support, visitation, and perio-
dic alimony payments.
121. Id. § 3105.63.
122. Id. § 3105.65(B).
123. MiLLiGAN 111.
124. OHIo R~v. CODE ANN. § 3105.63 (Page Supp. 1974).
125. See Norris, Divorce Reform: Ohio's Alternative to No-Fault, 48
STATE GOV'T 52, 55 (1975).
126. OmIo R.V. CODE ANN. § 3105.64 (Page Supp. 1974). Judge John R.
Milligan has written with respect to scheduling that "automatic assignment of
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serves primarily as a cooling-off period during which the parties may
make further attempts at reconciliation. If minor children are in-
volved, the hearings probably will be held more nearly to the 90-
day limit to allow time for child custody investigations ordered
pursuant to Ohio civil rule 75(D).127 Where child custody investi-
gations are not ordered, a chief sponsor of the new divorce laws,
State Representative Alan E. Norris, suggests that courts should try
to schedule hearings closer to the 30-day limit to expedite the pro-
ceedings and to encourage spouses to settle their differences prior to
filing.' 28
After filing of the petition and the appended separation agree-
ment, the court may appoint an attorney as a referee to review the
settlement.129 Both the parties and the referee may then amend the
agreement prior to the final hearing. 30
The final hearing itself should be "brief and to some more
civilized than under present practice.' ' 3 ' At the hearing the parties
will appear before the judge and affirm that: (1) they voluntarily
entered into the separation agreement, (2) they are still satisfied
with its terms, and (3) they want to dissolve their marriage. 132
The Ohio dissolution statute is similar to a model statute pro-
posed in 1969133 which was drafted with "a desire to minimize the
kind of state intervention which allows one individual to force his
or her will on the other.' 34 The theory of the dissolution statute
is that the parties themselves can best explore the viability of their
own marriage relationship and the possibility of reconciliation. As
the draftsmen of the model statute observed, the parties are not im-
mune from mistake, but they are probably the most competent
people to make these decisions for their family. They can best
the case exactly six (6) weeks from the date of filing at 10:00 a.m. puts the
matter on a track that eliminates much extra effort by court employees and
attorneys." Memorandum from Judge Milligan on the dissolution of marriage,
Fresh Air in Family Court (undated).
127. Omo R. Civ. P. 75(D). For a general discussion of discretionary
child custody investigations in Ohio, see 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 347 (1975).
128. See Norris, Divorce Reform, Ohio Style, 47 OmHo BAR 1031, 1034
(1974).
129. Norris, supra note 125, at 55.
130. Omo REv. CODE AinN. § 3105.63 (Page Supp. 1974).
131. Norris, supra note 128, at 1034. For the procedure followed in one
Ohio court see Milligan Memorandum, supra note 126, at 4.
132. OHo Rnv. CODE ANN,. § 3105.64 (Page Supp. 1974).
133. See Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 111, at 90-93.
134. See text following note 34 supra.
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evaluate what goals they share and what resources are available to
them.' 35
The primary benefit of the dissolution remedy is that it adds
necessary flexibility to Ohio's divorce remedies. Many couples who
want a divorce may be unwilling to bring a fault action or may be
unable to live apart for the required statutory term. The dissolution
statute reduces the disparity between legal theory and social reality
by permitting divorce by agreement. 38 The provision relies on the
logical assumption that a bilateral agreement constitutes excellent
prima facie proof of the failure of a marriage. Certainly, if both
parties have undergone the sobering experience of drawing all their
affairs to a close and have divided their marital property, the po-
tential -for reconciliation is minimal.
In dissolution proceedings the state's involvement will be signifi-
cantly less than in traditional divorce actions. The judge acts as
"monitor and overseer, rather than decision-maker"' 37 because the
parties have full control over their separation agreement. In support
of this minimization of judicial intrusion, Judge John R. Milligan of
Stark County, one of 'the creators of the concept of the dissolution
of marriage action, has written that "[t]his preference is consistent
with the prevalent psychological notion that people's actions are
always more committed and accepted if they are the result of agree-
ment, as opposed to imposed or inflicted judgment."' 38  When
parties can bilaterally resolve the wide range of issues associated with
traditional contested divorce, there is simply no need for extensive
court intervention. Less judicial participation also means that judges
will have more time to devote to other matters. Because collateral
issues -in divorce consume much of the time and energies of the
135. Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 111, at 91.
,136. Some commentators have characterized marriage itself as a contractual
relationship. See, e.g., Rieke, Dissolution Act of 1973: From. Status to Con-
tract?, 49 WASH. L. REv. 375 (1974); Sheresky & Mannes, A Radical Guide
to Wedlock, SATURDAY REviEW, July 29, 1972, at 33. This approach offers
a radical departure from the traditional view of marriage as a status. See, e.g.,
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). If society can accept the contractual
marriage concept, it is arguable that divorce can 'be treated in a similar manner.
Where parties are permitted to adopt relationships by their own preference,
they should also be empowered to terminate them, provided that both parties
are satisfied with the termination agreement and that they have made a good
faith effort to seek conciliation.




domestic law bench and bar, use of dissolution actions could mean
significant savings in time and expense.139
B. ,Criticisms of the Dissolution of Marriage Action
The dissolution of marriage provision has been subjected to both
valid and ill-founded criticism. A prime example of the accurate
criticism of the provision is the fear that -its bilateral nature, when
combined with what amounts to absolute veto power in both parties,
may lead to considerable inefficiencies in the divorce process. The
separation agreement must be accepted by both parties. 'If one
spouse has evidence that the other has engaged in acts that would
constitute grounds for a fault divorce, that spouse might use the evi-
dence as leverage to obtain a more favorable settlement. If either
spouse is dissatisfied with the agreement, for instance because the
party with the damaging evidence does not feel he or she took u
advantage of it or because the other party feels that the evidence
was used to coerce an unfavorable settlement, objection may be
made at the final hearing. The court must then dismiss the petition
and refuse to validate the agreement. 140 Since dismissal of the
petition is mandatory, much time and expense have been wasted
and the parties still do not have a divorce.
The potential for inefficiency is clear. A partial solution to the
problem is available, however, should the legislature choose so to act.
To deter parties from making frivolous objections, the legislature
need only change the language of the statute to make dismissal dis-
cretionary rather than mandatory upon objection of one of the
parties.141 Such an amendment would increase the number of com-
pleted dissolution agreements greatly with a minimum amount of
damage to all relevant considerations of fairness.
A second meritorious criticism of the dissolution provision is that
the mechanism reduces the opportunity for reconciliation because the
cooling-off period is shorter than for either the fault-based proceed-
ings or the living apart actions. 142 In answer to this criticism, it can
be argued that the legislation implicitly recognizes that when the
139. Judge MUlligan suggests as an additional method of saving time and
money that an amended petition for dissolution be allowed when agreement
has been reached in a pending contested case. Id. at 3.
1140. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.65(A) (Page Supp. 1974).
141. Address by Judge John V. Maxwell, Administrative Judge of the Divi-
sion of Domestic Relations, Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, at
Cuyahoga County Bar Association Domestic Relations Seminar, Oct. 2, 1974.
142. See note 49 supra.
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parties file for dissolution, they have passed the point of possible
reconciliation. The waiting period does not take into account the
time before the filing of the petition during which the parties
negotiated the initial agreement, a negotiation period that by its very
nature provides the time and subjective environment for reconcilia-
tion. Nevertheless, critics of the statute's brief cooling-off period
may have a valid complaint. To insure that parties beginning the
dissolution process have not reached their decision too hastily, how-
ever, conciliation services should be made more readily available.
Trained experts might determine through initial screening and, if
desired, further intensive counseling whether reconciliation is pos-
sible.143
Perhaps the most unfounded of the criticisms directed at the new
dissolution law is that its terms actually serve to encourage divorce
and discourage alternate, less radical methods of resolving marital
problems. 4 4  Although dissolution may provide a simple procedure
for obtaining a divorce, the requirement that the parties agree on
numerous difficult issues should dispel any notion that it makes di-
vorce easy. The realities of making financial arrangements neces-
sary to terminate a marriage should be an effective check against
hasty decisions to plunge into dissolution. Furthermore, it is not
necessarily true that couples will work harder to make their marriage
succeed if a state makes divorce more difficult to obtain. Other non-
legal factors are often more important in the success or failure of
a marriage:
Realism impels us to acknowledge that statutory provisions
have minimal impact upon the stability of marriage and
that economic conditions, psychological tensions, the in-
creasing independence of women, changes in religious atti-
tudes, high mobility, urban anonymity, and other factors,
143. See notes 147-61 infra and accompanying text.
144. A number of marital experts disagree with the notion that provisions
such as the dissolution of marriage statute will alter the way in which those
who marry view their relationship. They point out that a public belief in the
existence of fairly easy divorce and public acceptability of divorce as an insti-
tution has already come into being in -the United States. One national maga-
zine comments that, "It is broadly conceded that divorce is moving toward the
status of 'normal' in the thinking of Americans." U.S. NEws AND WORLD RE-
PORT, Jan. 13, 1975, at 43. One commentator observes in this regard that
"fairly easy availability of divorce has become part of the consciousness of the
people." Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8
J. FAMiLY L. 179, 187 (1968).
[Vol. 25:844
DIVORCE REFORMS
all have more to do with marriage stability and the inci-
dence of divorce than does 'the statutory framework.145
In short, the purposes of divorce law should be -to promote family
stability rather than to make the procurement of a divorce difficult.
These arguments suggest that the dissolution statute will not cheapen
the status of marriage, nor will it open the courts to a flood of divorce
requests.' 40
V. CONCILIATION OF MARITAL CONTROVERSIES
The General Assembly also enacted a provision to make concilia-
tion services more easily available to parties in a divorce, annulment,
alimony, or dissolution proceeding. 47 It provides that the court, on
its own motion or by motion of one of the parties, may order concilia-
tion for a period not to exceed 90 days.148 While most experts recog-
nize that conciliation courts represent an effective device to allow
145. Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 179, 184
(1973). See M. REwsIrE, MAIuoAE STAmLrrY, DIVORCE, AND Tim LAW
307 (1972); Isaacs, The Urban Family: Urban Marriage and Divorce, 1
FAMILY L.Q. 39 (1967).
146. The statistics for Cuyahoga County from September 23, 1974, the date
of enactment, to April 1, 1975 show the following number of petitions for dis-








Interview with Teresa Caipinelli, Assistant Deputy Divorce Commissioner of
the Divorce Assignment Bureau of Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio, April
18, 1975.
147. OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 3105.091(A) (Page Supp. 1974) provides
that:
At any time after thirty days from the service of summons or first
publication of notice in an action for divorce, annulment, or alimony,
or at any time after filing a petition for dissolution of marriage, -the
Court of Common Pleas, upon its own motion or the motion of one
of the parties, may order the parties to undergo conciliation for the
period of time not exceeding ninety days as the court specifies. The
order requiring conciliation shall set forth the conciliation procedure
and name the conciliator. The conciliation procedures may include
without limitation referrals to the conciliation judge as provided in
Chapter 3117 of the Revised Code, public or private marriage coun-
selors, family service agencies, community health services, physicians,
licensed psychologists, or clergymen. The costs of any conciliation
procedures shall be paid by the parties.
148. Courts should allow the cooling-off period to extend beyond 90 days
if the parties require more time to discuss their problems. Courts should not
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spouses "to back away from a hasty decision," 149 judges in Ohio are
reluctant to use their discretionary power to order conciliation be-
cause the parties are required to pay for the service. 150 In fact, no
county has used conciliation courts since their inception in 1969.11'
Ohio's two new no-fault grounds for divorce have placed the con-
ciliation issue in a different light by changing the decision whether
the parties should be granted a divorce from one made primarily by
the court to one made primarily by the parties. The dissolution pro-
vision in particular allows the parties a great deal of discretion in
deciding whether to terminate their marriage, provided they can
agree on the collateral issues. Experts believe that some form of
mandatory conciliation should be required in states with no-fault pro-
visions to protect the spouses from hastily made divorce decisions. 152
For example, much of the criticism of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act, which adopted a no-fault standard153 similar to Califor-
nia's standard of irretrievable breakdown, has been directed toward
its failure to include detailed provisions for counseling and concilia-
tion services.' 54
Ideally, the conciliation courts could assume a new role to meet
this changing need for their assistance. Not only might their inter-
vention prevent premature divorce, but their function would serve
the interest of the state in preserving viable marriages. This interest
requires that all possibilities be explored before divorce. Through
the conciliation courts, the state can inquire more thoroughly into the
condition of a marriage.
hasten the termination of a relationship that has the slightest chance of recon-
ciliation. The former chairman of the Family Law Section of the American
Bar Association has written in this regard that "Ei]t has been proved to my
satisfaction without any doubt that delay coupled with a reconciliation inquiry
is the single most important factor available which can lead to reconciliation
in divorce proceedings." Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 169, 172 (1973). A similar maximum
cooling-off period is set forth in UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT §
305(a).
149. WHEELER, supra note 105, at 116.
150. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3105.091 (Page Supp. 1974).
151. Norris, supra note 128, at 1038. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§
3117.01-.08 (Page Supp. 1974).
152. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAws, 1971 MIDYEAR REPORT AND RECOMmENDATION OF THE FAMILY
LAw SEcrIoN TO THE ABA Housn OF DELEGATES ON THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIvORCE ACT, 5 FAMILY L.Q. 133, 165 (1971).
153. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 305.
154. Zuckman & Fox, The Ferment in Divorce Legislation, 12 J. FAMILY
L. 515, 577 (1973).
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Parties to a divorce or dissolution action may themselves be
ignorant of the types of assistance available to meet their individual
problems.' 5 5 The conciliation courts can serve as clearinghouses to
inform parties of the availability of counseling resources. Further-
more, marital discord often involves subtle and complex psychologi-
cal factors, which usually cannot be recognized by disputing spouses.
Conciliation courts, by referring a spouse to a counseling specialist
who can identify these hidden problem areas, can help arrest the
momentum that a divorce action can gain, often independent of the
true wishes of the parties. Because of these benefits conciliation
courts should be made more available to spouses who are uncertain
in their desires regarding divorce or who are ignorant of the kinds
of assistance available to them.
It is not suggested that mandatory conciliation be imposed on all
parties who desire a no-fault divorce. The resources of the state can-
not be wasted on financing conciliation efforts where the chances for
a marriage's revival are small. Some means must be employed to
concentrate conciliation efforts on couples who have the best chance
of reconciling their differences.
What is needed in Ohio is an initial screening process. 156 This
procedure may consist of a group meeting, a personal interview, a
questionnaire, or a combination of these. Michigan, for example,
has a procedure that requires the attorney to complete a form with
his divorce complaint.' 57 The form is then forwarded to the county
counseling service, where it is examined and categorized by the
parties' general area of residence. When 1,000 forms in any one
area have accumulated, a letter is sent to each couple inviting them
to attend an orientation meeting where the available conciliatory ser-
vices will be explained. 158 The success of these efforts is well-
documented. Eight out of ten people attending the group orientation
meeting expressed interest in further counseling. Six out of ten felt
that the meeting itself shed new light on their prior thinking and
155. See Alexander, The Family Court-An Obstacle Race?, d9 U. PriTr.
L. Rnv. 602, 607 (1958).
156. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4505 (West 1970).
157. When filing a complaint for divorce in Wayne County, Michigan, an
attorney fills out a short form stating: (1) Name, address and age of plaintiff
and defendant; (2) date of marriage; (3) number of children; (4) name and
address of plaintiff's attorney. Staniec, Ninety Seconds Relieve Divorce Strain,
52 MicH. ST. BJ. 295, 296 (1973).
158. Id.
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caused them to question the advisability of continuing the court di-
vorce action.1 59
Properly employed, these screening procedures can guard against
unthinking continuation of divorce actions. They constitute the best
solution to the criticism that no-fault statutes permit divorces to be
granted too quickly and with too little judicial control. In addition,
the screening process can be relatively simple and inexpensive and
can accurately identify those who will benefit from the conciliatory
services.
The goal of the screening procedure is to encourage people who
need the counseling to obtain it. The optimum result of such ser-
vices is to have the parties resolve their differences so that they can
remain married. However, even if reconciliation cannot be attained,
the conciliation process may produce a number of benefits for individ-
ual couples. The counseling can help the parties agree on certain
collateral matters such as alimony, child support, child custody, and
property division, so that the couple may enter the divorce pro-
ceeding with a more rational frame of mind. Personal benefits may
result from close self-examination, so that parties may place their
problems in perspective and adapt more easily to uncertain fu-
tures.1 60 Finally, the conciliatory efforts may have a postdivorce
effect of preparing the spouses for a difficult adjustment period after
the marriage has been terminated.
Opponents of screening procedures might object to intrusions into
the spouses' privacy. However, initial screening efforts to discover
those marriages that are capable of being preserved will not involve
extensive inquiries into private matters because the courts do not
wish to coerce the parties into reconciling their differences. The key
concept is screening, not therapy. As one expert explains: "[This]
system does not force . . . a party to stretch out on the psychiatric
couch. . . or to endure brainwashing."' 6' The purpose of the initial
screening process is to induce parties who wish to question their deci-
sion to seek divorce to take advantage of conciliation services.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ohio's divorce system has been considerably strengthened by the
159. Id. at 297.
160. See M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 145, at 441; Staniec, supra note 157, at
296.
161. M. WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE 102 (1974).
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adoption of the 1974 reforms. The broad aim of a society's divorce
laws should be to adapt to changing social mores and conditions.
The Ohio General Assembly has approached such a goal by wisely
and carefully adopting these reforms. Each of the new reforms, with
the exception of the dissolution of marriage action, has been tested
in other states.
The disparity between theory and social reality has been signifi-
cantly diminished by these wide-ranging provisions. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the abolition of recrimination as a bar to di-
vorce. The adoption of two no-fault remedies adds increased flexi-
bility to Ohio's previously rigid fault-based divorce structure. Sev-
eral new types of divorce are available to cover the various marital
situations that may arise. While the reforms specifically focus on
a large number of potential problem areas, Ohio's judges will still
have sufficient discretion to deal with new problems not covered by
the statutes in light of the policies expressed by the reforms.
Several additional changes might be enacted, most notably the
establishment of conciliation screening services, and -the lowering of
the living apart requirement to 1 year. Fortunately, the divorce
structure is flexible enough to allow for these future changes. The
legislature has adjusted the balance between the state's interest in
preserving the integrity of marriage and its interest in giving parties
freedom to begin new lives if their relationship has truly dissolved.
ROBERT B. JONES
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